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Preface. Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1. Kripke on the A Priori and the Necessary. 2. Necessity, Certainty and A Priori. 3. Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge. 4. Causality, Reliabilism, and Mathematical Knowledge. 5. The Coherence and Empiricism. 6. A Priori Knowledge. 7. Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification. 8. Testimony and A Priori Knowledge. 9. Analyzing A Priori Knowledge. 10. Knowledge and Modality. 11. Intuition, Thought Experiment, and the A priori. 12. Counterfactuals and Modal Knowledge. 13. Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. 14. Articulating the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction.

Ed. Russell, Gillian and Graff F. Delia. *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language*, New York, Routledge, 2012, pp. 924.

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Hung, Edwing. *Philosophy of Science, a Text on Traditional Problems and Schools of Thought*, USA, Cengage Learning, 2013, pp. 512.

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Pinker, Steven. *Language, Cognition, and Human Nature; Selected Articles*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 392.

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Jaworski, William. *Philosophy of mind: a comprehensive introduction*, Malaysia, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 424.

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